Past Conferences

Click the links below to see the schedules, keynote speakers, guest speakers, presenters, and commentators of our previous conferences. Abstracts made available where possible.

Keynote Speaker
Susanna Schellenberg
Rutgers University

Commentator
Richard Feldman
University of Rochester

Distinguished Alumni Speaker
Brandon Carey
Columbia Basin College
friday, october 21st
Registration/Welcome
2:00PM-2:30PM
Session I
2:30PM-3:20PM
Credence Permissiveness and Scoring Rules
View Abstract
Marc-Kevin Daoust and David Montminy
Université de Montréal
Commentary by Kolja Keller
Following Kelly (2010), Meacham (2014) and Schoenfield (2014), credence permissiveness seems highly plausible. Following Pettigrew (2016a; 2016b), measuring epistemic disutility through strictly proper scoring rules (like the Brier score) also seems highly plausible. However, both claims are incompatible. How do we solve that problem? In this paper we argue that 1- credence permissiveness and strictly proper scoring rules are incompatible; 2- that holding uncalibrated scoring rules can lead an agent to hold inconsistent credences; and 3- that credence permissiveness conflicts with a basic rationality requirement, namely, being responsive to new evidence.
Session II
3:30PM-4:20PM
Memory and Testimonial Injustice
View Abstract
Alicia Patterson
Cornell University
Commentary by Kelley Annesley
Testimony is encoded into memory, changing the information of that memory. The testimony changes the memory into misinformation, and other times it fixes it to produce true beliefs. These cases are called “helpful incorporation.” A worry about cases of helpful incorporation is the accuracy of those beliefs will largely be subject to luck. Kourken Michaelian argues we can count helpful incorporation as knowledge because testimony is generally reliable. He argues people are generally sincere, meaning they don’t lie. And we generally perceive people as being credible. These two bias work together to produce reliable testimony. I pose Fricker-style objections to show testimony is actually not nearly as reliable as Michaelian argues it to be. Negative stereotypes about groups of people make it less likely that their true testimony will be seen as sincere. This has the odd effect of making prejudiced people’s beliefs more conservative, and less likely to incorporate false testimony into their memory. Positive stereotypes, however, make it more likely the speaker will be seen as credible when they are not. Given our prejudices, we’re not reliably good at picking out credible testimony. As a result, we should not trust that helpful incorporation is more reliable than luck.
Coffee Break
4:20PM-4:45PM
Session III
4:45PM-6:15PM
Knowledge Requires Counterfactual Evidence
Abstract Unavailable
Brandon Carey - Distinguished Alumnus Speaker
Columbia Basin College
Commentary by Jannai Shields
Conference Party
7:00PM-10:00PM
saturday, october 22nd
Continental Breakfast
9:00AM-9:55AM
Welcome
9:55AM-10:00AM
Session IV
10:00AM-10:50AM
Epistemic Punishments
View Abstract
David Black
Rutgers University
Commentary by Matthew Lamb
The epistemic injustice literature has focused on wrongful epistemic harms. I argue that such harms can sometimes be permissibly inflicted as epistemic punishments. When agents are epistemically culpable for their false testimony, we have epistemic reasons to epistemically harm them. In addition to being interesting in their own right, epistemic punishment helps to give substance to views which appeal to epistemic blameworthiness or excuse. In section 2, I present a catalog of epistemic offenses and epistemic punishments. In section 3, I argue that the things I call epistemic punishments really are. In particular, they are (i) epistemic harms, (ii) inflicted in response to (alleged) epistemically culpable wrong-doing that (iii) would otherwise epistemically wrong someone subject to them. Section 4 concludes by briefly discussing how my view fits in with other views of punishment, and points out interesting new questions for the future.
Session V
11:00AM-11:50AM
Luck and Disagreement
View Abstract
Samuel Kampa
Fordham University
Commentary by Nathanael Smith
Both luck and disagreement are widely discussed topics in contemporary epistemology. And yet there are almost no sustained treatments of the relationship between luck and disagreement. Why has so little been written on the subject? Are there simply no interesting connections between luck and disagreement? I maintain, on the contrary, that luck and disagreement are conceptually and normatively linked and that this linkage should be of interest to anyone concerned with either luck or disagreement. Moreover, I argue that evidence of peer disagreement just is evidence of knowledge-precluding luck, that the normative significance of peer disagreement reduces to the normative significance of knowledge-precluding luck, and that one’s theory of luck bears directly on one’s approach to peer disagreement. The ultimate upshot is that luck and disagreement are closely related and that their relatedness matters.
Catered Lunch
12:00PM-1:30PM
Session VI
2:00PM-2:50PM
Defending Traditional (Indirect) Virtue Epistemology
View Abstract
Luis Pinto de Sa
Saint Louis University
Commentary by John Komdat
Lisa Miracchi and Christoph Kelp have argued against indirect virtue epistemology (IVE), called “indirect” since “it aims to analyze knowledge in terms of a competence to do something other than know”. Kelp’s and Miracchi’s arguments turn on the putative inability of IVE to accommodate widespread intuitions about crucial cases. For Kelp, IVE cannot simultaneously accommodate our intuitions regarding both epistemic Frankfurt cases and Fake Barn cases. For Miracchi, IVE is unable to explain why we fail to know in certain Gettier cases.

In this paper, I argue that John Greco’s version of IVE has the resources to (1) explain away our intuition about Kelp’s epistemic Frankfurt case while preserving the intuition about Fake Barns; and (2) explain why one fails to know in Miracchi’s Gettier cases. Hence, there is at least one brand of IVE that can withstand Kelp’s and Miracchi’s objections.
Coffee Break
3:00PM-3:30PM
Session VII
3:30PM-5:45PM
The Origins of Perceptual Knowledge
Abstract Unavailable
Susanna Schellenberg - Keynote Speaker
Rutgers University
Commentary by Richard Feldman
Conference Dinner
7:00PM
For speakers, commentators, and faculty
Location: The King and I
Keynote Speaker
Thomas Kelly
Princeton University

Commentator
Earl Conee
University of Rochester

Distinguished Alumni Speaker
Jonathan Matheson
University of North Florida
friday, october 24th
Registration/Welcome
2:00PM-2:30PM
Session I
2:30PM-3:20PM
Perceptual Expectations and Epistemic Downgrade
Abstract Unavailable
Zoe Jenkin
Harvard University
Commentary by James Elliot
Session II
3:30PM-4:20PM
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement
Abstract Unavailable
Remco Heesen and Pieter van der Kolk
University of Groningen
Commentary by Matt Frise
Session III
4:45PM-6:15PM
Peer Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief
Abstract Unavailable
Jon Matheson - Special Guest Speaker
University of North Florida
Commentary by Brian Barnett
Conference Party
7:00PM-10:00PM
saturday, october 25th
Continental Breakfast
9:00AM-9:55AM
Welcome
9:55AM-10:00AM
Session IV
10:00AM-10:50AM
Dogmatism Without Mooreanism
Abstract Unavailable
Jonathan Fuqua
Purdue University
Commentary by Andrew Greenlee
Session V
11:00AM-11:50AM
Knowledge from Knowledge
Abstract Unavailable
Rodrigo Borges
Rutgers University
Commentary by John Komdat
Catered Lunch
12:00PM-1:30PM
Session VI
2:00PM-2:50PM
Against Cohen’s Defense of the Equal Weight View
Abstract Unavailable
Julia Smith
University of Toronto
Commentary by Emmett Wilson
Coffee Break
3:00PM-3:30PM
Session VII
3:30PM-5:45PM
Historical vs. Current Time Slice Theories of Epistemic Justification
Abstract Unavailable
Tom Kelley - Keynote Speaker
Princeton University
Commentary by Earl Conee
Conference Dinner
7:00PM
For speakers, commentators, and faculty
Location: Chen Garden
Keynote Speaker
Michael Huemer
University of Colorado, Boulder

Commentator
Richard Feldman
University of Rochester

Distinguished Alumni Speaker
Trent Dougherty
Baylor University
friday, october 19th
Registration/Welcome
2:00PM-2:30PM
Session I
2:30PM-3:20PM
Epistemic Agency and the Generality Problem
Abstract Unavailable
Lisa Miracchi
Rutgers University
Commentary by Matt Frise
Session II
3:30PM-5:45PM
The Failure of Analysis and the Nature of Concepts
Abstract Unavailable
Michael Huemer - Keynote Speaker
University of Colorado, Boulder
Commentary by Richard Feldman
Conference Party
6:30PM-10:00PM
saturday, october 20th
Continental Breakfast
9:00AM-9:55AM
Welcome
9:55AM-10:00AM
Session III
10:00AM-10:50AM
Formal Issues in the Epistemology of Disagreement
Abstract Unavailable
Yoaav Isaacs
Princeton University
Commentary by Adrian Arellano
Session IV
11:00AM-11:50AM
Knowledge You Shouldn't Act On
Abstract Unavailable
John Giannini
Baylor University
Commentary by Dustin Olson
Catered Lunch
12:00PM-1:30PM
Session V
2:00PM-2:50PM
Credence and Correctness: In Defense of the Threshold View
Abstract Unavailable
Matthew Lee
University of Notre Dame
Commentary by Matthew Baddorf
Session VI
3:00PM-3:50PM
When Is a Belief True Because of Luck?
Abstract Unavailable
Preston Greene
Rutgers University
Commentary by Andrew Greenlee
Break
3:50PM-4:30PM
Session VII
4:30PM-6:00PM
Reducing Testimony
Abstract Unavailable
Trent Dougherty - Special Guest Speaker
Baylor University
Commentary by Bill Rowley
Conference Dinner
7:00PM
For speakers, commentators, and faculty
Location: Chen Garden